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Abstract
The global financial crisis of 2008 that hit many countries had become an important concern, especially the
banking industry in Indonesia.  This was because first, the experience of the economic crisis of 1997-1998.
Second, the nature of the crisis could spread to other countries.  So this study aimed to examine empirically the
impact of the global economic contraction on the behavior of bank credit in Indonesia.  Using panel data source
from the Word Bank and Bank Indonesia Year 2004-2012, the data were analyzed with Dynamic Panel Data
using E-views program 8. The results showed that the global economic contraction had a significant effect on
the behavior of credit in foreign and joint venture banks in Indonesia in 2004-2012.
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Economic behavior economics has become an in-
teresting study from many world researchers at
the world. One of the studies is the lending be-
havior. Lending behavior judged from the in-
crease and decrease in the growth of the credit
amount that banks channeled. Current economic
conditions are one of the things that influence
lending behavior banks, especially when eco-
nomic integration increases. Kotz (2010) revealed
a long-term perspective that the liberalization of
trade and international capital markets has gone
hand in hand, with increasing economic integra-
tion at the global level. The internationalization
of banking activities has naturally contributed to
the bank itself due to the universal impulse toward
economic integration between countries. Global in-
tegration has paved the way for other countries to
transfer how to run an international standard bank-
ing activities. The goal is to become more efficient
in the use of resources. But at the same time, finan-
cial integration also facilitates the transmission of
shockwaves across countries. As a result, a crisis in
a country will have an impact on other countries.
The study conducted by Raz et al. (2012)
found the impact of the crisis on the Economic of
East Asian region, both East Asian financial crisis
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in 1997 and the global financial crisis of 2008. But
there is a different between the two crises, in which
the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 has provided
knowledge for each country to be better prepared
so when the 2008 global financial crisis hits, com-
pared with crisis in 1997. Micco & Panizza (2006)
found that state-owned banks may play a credit
smoothing role. It shows that their lending is less
responsive to macroeconomic shocks than the lend-
ing of private banks (both domestically and for-
eign-owned). This suggests that state-owned
banks could play a useful role in the transmission
of monetary policy.
When viewed from the theoretical frame-
work, the 2008 crisis that occurred in the United
States has become evidence that the instability of
the financial sector due to subprime mortgage have
caused global economic contraction. That is, the
credit behaviors of the banking industry have trig-
gered the onset of the crisis. This is consistent with
the theory of disaster myopia. Davis (2001) in Raz
et al. (2012) describes the theory of disaster myo-
pia, that financial instability occurs when the be-
haviors of financial institutions ignore the cred-
ibility of the borrower and the risk is reduced.
Indeed, the impact of general economic cri-
sis started from the turmoil of the financial sector.
Although Prasetyantoko (2008) describes the dy-
namics of economic fluctuations become common-
place in the financial sector, that is when the fluc-
tuations are too large, it can cause symptoms of
instability over a long time and continuously can
lead to a crisis. But a crisis can occur if the control
measures against the turmoil in the financial sec-
tor cannot be addressed, followed by contraction
of the overall economy. So crisis begins with in-
stability in the financial sector.
Despite the crisis, to Scuhmpeter (Prasetyan-
toko, 2008), this condition is common in the dy-
namics of the capitalist economic system. In accor-
dance with the theory of the business cycle,
Scuhmpeter assess the economy will move to the
stage of recession and boom. If the injections of
capital (lending) banks do not support the inno-
vation process of economic actors, then the
economy is in recession. In contrast, when the in-
novations have a positive impact, as a result of the
capital injection, the economy would be booming.
But Minsky in the Financial Instability Hypothesis
assess the boom period creates financial insecu-
rity. Periods of economic boom creates overly
optimistic behavior that tends to take risk and less
cautious in debt. As a result, low quality loan port-
folio and risk in the economic sectors are increased.
Allen et al. (2011) who studied foreign-
owned banks and government-owned banks in
Central and Eastern Europe, found different re-
actions during the global financial crisis in 2008.
The study found that foreign banks reduced credit
during crisis, while the government-owned banks
increased credit. As a result, the risk transmission
is increased from foreign banks, but the govern-
ment-owned banks may hamper it. While De Haas
& van Lelyveld (2006) that examines the specifics
foreign and domestic banks in Central and East-
ern Europe, found different reactions to the busi-
ness cycle and the crisis conditions of the banks
country of origin. The result is that the bank coun-
try of origin has an important condition for the
growth of the foreign banks, because there is a
significant and negative relationship between
country of origin economic growth (home coun-
try) and the host country with credit in foreign
banks. Pontines & Siregar (2012) who also specifi-
cally examined the ASEAN region’s foreign banks
and joint venture banks when the global economic
crisis in 2008 with the result that foreign banks
tend to come out or pull out from the host coun-
try when recession occurs, resulting in the reduced
of total outstanding loans of foreign banks to the
host country.
The study shows that the crisis does not
necessarily indicate an impact on the reduction in
lending. The impact of the crisis is likely causing
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varying results, where some banks decreases lend-
ing, but others increase lending. For those who in-
crease lending, it is because affiliate offices of for-
eign banks in the host country can rely on its par-
ent bank to gain support in the event of a crisis, so
that foreign banks become insensitive to the crisis.
As for banks that reduce lending, it is because of
the nature and scale of the sharpness of the global
financial crisis has recently led to a reduction of
capital of the parent bank, so that the crisis affects
loan distribution reductions in the home country
and the host country as found in De Haas & van
Lelyveld (2010), Silalahi et al. (2012), Choi et al.
(2013), and De Haas & Lelyveld (2014). Signs of
economic crisis can also be seen from the decline in
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a country. For
GDP, Mohanty et al. (2006), Bebczuk, et al. (2010),
Guo & Stepanyan (2011), and Silalahi, et al (2012)
found a significant positive effect increasing GDP
led to the increase of lending.
METHOD
The model in this study adapted to the stud-
ies by Pontines & Siregar (2012) and Allen et al.
(2011) that look at the impact of economy crisis on
a country. Pontines & Siregar (2012) specifically
studied ASEAN countries’ foreign and private
Banks Ni 2008. Allen et al. (2011) also studied the
global crisis impact to lending from private and
government owned banks in Europe. This study
aims to complete both previous studies that is to
examine the effect of global economic contraction
which was mark with global economic crisis in 2008
and 2009 towards Indonesia’s banking credit from
foreign, joint venture and domestic (including
government owned) in 2004-2012 which can be
seen in Table 1 with the following model:
Foreign and Joint Venture Banks
GLoani,t = GLoani,t-1 + Crisisi,t + Crisis*JoinVenturei,t
+ GGDPHome i,t + IntRateHome i,t +
GGDPHost i,t + IntRateHost i,t +
Profitabilityi,t + Solvencei,t + Sizei,t +  i,t
Domestic Banks
GLoani,t = GLoani,t-1 + Crisisi,t + Crisis*Govermenti,t
+ GGDPHost i,t + IntRateHost i,t +
Profitabilityi,t + Solvencei,t + Sizei,t +  i,t
The independent variables used in this study
is Lending Behavior proxied from Credit Growth
(GLoan) of foreign, joint venture and domestic
banks in year t or 2004-2012. The global economic
contraction was marked with global economic cri-
sis which occur in 2008 and 2009. The crisis vari-
able is expected to be negative. For the other
dummy variables, an interaction was done be-
tween crisis variable and bank ownership. The
purpose is to see the behavior difference between
foreign and joint venture banks (Crisis* Join Ven-
ture) and Government owned banks with other
Domestic Banks (Crisis* Government). For the
macro economy variables used are GDP of the
banks’ home country (GGDPHome) and the in-
terest rate banks’ home country (IntRateHome) and
also Indonesia’s GDP (GGDPHost i) and
Indonesia’s interest rate (IntRateHosti,t). But for
the Domestic Banks only uses GGDP variable and
IntRateHost. Studies by Pontines & Siregar (2012)
and Allen et al. (2011) found that GDP
(GGDPHome and GGDPHost) and interest rate
(IntRateHost) pushes bank to be expansive in credit
lending so the expectation of GDP variable
(GGDPHome and GGDPHost) and interest rate
(IntRateHost) towards credit lending is positive.
Meanwhile the IntRateHome variable pushes bank
to lend credit more at the home country so the
expectation of credit lending variable is negative.
Not only the macro economy variable, the com-
pany characteristic also used as profitability
proxied with Return on Asset (ROA). The vari-
ables of profitability, solvency, and the size of com-
pany (SIZE) are expected to be positive. Meaning
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that all three variables (profitability, solvelence,
and size) pushes banks to be expansive towards
credit.
Data used are secondary data from bank
unaudited monthly financial report from January
2004 to December 2012, as published at Bank In-
donesia website (www.bi.go.id) which then ag-
gregated into yearly data. While the macro
economy data used in this study are GDP and in-
terest rate of home country of foreign and joint
venture banks from World Bank and BI rate data
and GDP each year as published by Bureau of Sta-
tistic and Bank Indonesia. The sampling method
used is purposive sampling. The criteria used is
thoroughly examined variable with regular finan-
cial report published each month. So from 110
banks made as samples are 96 banks which consist
of 73 domestic banks (4 public banks, 28 national
private banks, 17 national non private bank, and
24 regional banks) and 23 foreign and joint ven-
ture banks (8 foreign banks and 15 joint venture
banks).
Dependent Variable Descriptions Data Sources 
Credit Behavior GLoani,t Credit growth of bank i in year t Bank Indonesia 
Independent Variables   
Crisis Crisisi,t Dummy variable; where 1 = global 
financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, 0 = 
others 
 
Crisis interaction with 
joint venture banks 
Crisis*Join 
Venture i,t 
Dummy variable; where 1 = global 
financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, 0 = 
others 
World Bank 
Crisis Interaction with 
Governement Owned 
Banks 
Crisis*Govermen
t i,t 
Dummy variable; where 1 = global 
financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, 0 = 
others 
World Bank 
GDP of foreign and 
joint venture banks’ 
home country. 
GGDPHomei,t The indicator of macroeconomic 
condition at home country of foreign 
and joint venture banks as financing 
source. 
World Bank 
Rate interest at home 
country of foreign and 
joint venture banks. 
IntRateHomei,t The indicator of macroeconomic 
condition at home country of foreign 
and joint venture banks as financing 
source. 
World Bank 
GDP of host country GGDPHosti,t The indicator of macroeconomic 
condition at host country (Indonesia) as 
financing destination. 
BPS 
Interest rate of host 
country. 
IntRateHosti,t The indicator of macroeconomic 
condition at host country (Indonesia). 
Bank Indonesia 
Bank profitability rate. Profitabilitas it Return On Asset  Bank Indonesia 
Size comparison 
between capital and 
asset. 
Solvenceit Ratio of Equity and Total Asset. Bank Indonesia 
Company size.  SIZEit Log Natura of Total Asset  Bank Indonesia 
β2- β9 Regression coefficient 
ε it Residual value (error) 
 
Table 1. Research Variables Operational Definitions
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The analysis tools used in this study is dy-
namic panel (GMM method) with help from E-
Views 8 programs. The reliability of the dynamic
panel model is determine by test such as (1) unbi-
ased test by comparing coefficient estimation re-
sult with OLS and Fixed Effect. If the dynamic
variable coefficient estimated below OLS and
above all fixed effect estimation, the model is not
biased. (2) Validity test with Sargan test, is valid
if there is no correlation between instruments with
error component. Zero hypothesis from Sargan
test declared that the instrument has no problem
 Gloan Crisis Crisis* Subs. 
Crisis* 
Gov 
GGDP 
Home 
Int 
Home 
GGDP 
Host 
Int 
host Prof. Solv. Size 
Model 1: Foreign and Joint venture Banks 
 Mean 6.414 0.222 0.135 - 7.826 2.675 5.798 7.992 1.548 0.143 15.66 
 Max. 180.7 1.000 1.000 - 31.39 11.78 6.490 12.75 7.390 0.960 17.79 
 Min. 0.000 0.000 0.000 - -17.85 -3.90 4.630 5.750 0.000 0.000 12.77 
 Std. Dev. 19.07 0.416 0.342 - 9.622 2.308 0.604 2.141 0.149 0.128 1.259 
Model 2: Domestic Banks 
 Mean 2.311 0.222 -  0.012 -  -  5.798 7.992 1.296 0.129 15.22 
 Max. 30.14 1.000 -  1.000 -  -  6.490 12.750 9.180 2.490 20.05 
 Min. -5.530 0.000 -  0.000 -  -  4.630 5.750 -9.380 -0.020 11.29 
 Std. Dev. 3.056 0.416  - 0.110 -  -  0.603 2.138 1.025 0.113 1.835 
 
Tabel 2. Summary Statistic of Dependent and Explanatory Variables
 Crisis Crisis* Subs. 
GGDP 
Home 
Int 
Home 
GGDP 
Host 
Int 
host Prof. Solv. Size 
Model 1: Foreign and Joint venture Banks 
Crisis 1.000 0.740** -0.317** -0.002 -0.423** -0.029 0.018 -0.024 0.061 
Crisis*Subs.  1.000 -0.256** 0.056 -0.313** -0.022 0.011 0.061 -0.079 
GGDPHome   1.000 -0.136 0.266** 0.073 0.056 -0.155* -0.071 
IntHome    1.000 -0.126 0.162* 0.055 0.110 -0.099 
GGDPHost     1.000 -0.140* -0.138* 0.032 0.177* 
IntHost      1.000 0.045 -0.105 -0.226** 
Prof       1.000 0.286** 0.013 
Solv.        1.000 -0.334** 
Size         1.000 
 Crisis Crisis* Gov 
GGDP 
Host 
Int 
host Prof. Solv. Size 
Model 2: Domestic Banks 
Crisis 1.000 0.208** -0.423** -0.029 -0.084* 0.034 0.019 
Crisis*Gov  1.000 -0.088* -0.006 -0.047 -0.040 0.221** 
GGDPHome   1.000 -0.140** -0.081* -0.050 0.136** 
IntHost    1.000 -0.027 -0.009 -0.181** 
Prof     1.000 0.069 0.025 
Solv.      1.000 -0.183** 
Size       1.000 
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix for the Explanatory Variables
Notes: The table presents the results from Spearman ñ correlation coefficients.”” and “ indicates significance at 1% and 5% levels
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with validity and (3) Consistency test with Arrellano-
Bond is when probability of order 1 shows value
under significant at 10% (significant), while order
2 with probability smaller than significant at 10%
(not significant), then this model is consistent
(Baltagi, 2005, Pontines & Siregar, 2012).
RESULT
This study aims to complete both previous
studies that is to examine the effect of global eco-
nomic contraction which was mark with financial
crisis in 2008 and 2009 towards Indonesia’s bank-
ing credit from foreign, joint venture and domes-
tic (including government owned) in 2004-2012.
The present study uses an balanced panel of Indo-
nesia commercial banks (summary statistics of the
variables used are presented in Table 2).
Table 3 provides information on the degree
of correlation between the explanatory variables
used in the multivariate regression analysis. The
matrix shows that in general the correlation be-
Variable Foreign and Joint venture Banks Domestic Banks Model 1 Model 2 
GLoani,t-1 0,136939**  
(25,57253) 
-0,018051 
(-0,865446) 
Dummy Crisisi,t -10,68507** 
(-15,78181) 
0,232438 
(1,271179) 
Dummy Crisis*Subsidiaryi,t 17,54189** 
(15,06559) 
 
Dummy Crisis*Govermenti,t  0,041820 
(0,050643) 
GGDPHomei,t 0,226585** 
(5,087937) 
 
IntHomei,t 0,862626** 
(3,682150) 
 
GGDPHosti,t -2,159636** 
(-5,445451) 
0,273622** 
(2,264681) 
Inthosti,t -1,832602** 
(-15,99106) 
-0,258182** 
(-4,671999) 
Profitabilitasi,t 1,811577** 
(5,853748) 
0,266674** 
(3,569467) 
Solvencei,t 8,926197* 
(2,168553) 
1,473594 
(0,715807) 
Sizei,t -7.902415** 
(0,0000) 
-1.921114 
(-6,302679) 
Koefisien GLoani,t-1   
OLS 0,248762 0,145070 
Fixed Effect 0,108262 -0,016074 
AR1 0,000000 0,0000 
AR2 0,000000 0,0005 
Hansen J 0,418982 0,609544 
Number of obs. 207 657 
 Note: **significant at 99% confidence level; *significant at 95% confidence level
Table 4. Result of Dynamic Panel Model of Banking Credit Model in Indonesia in 2004-2012
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tween explanatory variables are not strong, thus
suggesting that multicollinearity problems are not
severe or non-existent.
On the estimation of crisis impact to credit
behavior by using dynamic panel approach there
were endogen variable lag that appears at the ex-
ogenous variable, as the reliability test result
shows in Table 2. On Arrellano-Bond test, either
model 1 and 2 shows probability of significant
order 1 or order 2 as significant. And so from the
Arrellano-Bond test declared that the model has
consistency problems. Next is the Sargan probabil-
ity test that shows model 1 and 2 values 0,418982
and 0,609544 respectively, meaning that the test
reject zero hypothesis. And thus this model did
not have validity issue (valid model). For biased
test, either model 1 and 2 found variable lag esti-
mated coefficient under OLS estimated coefficient
and above fixed effect estimated coefficient, and
so model 1 and 2 is not biased.
DISCUSSION
The impact of crisis to the lending behavior
are different between foreign joint venture banks
and domestic banks. The negative crisis has sig-
nificant effect towards lending behavior and not
significant to domestic banks. This shows that for-
eign and joint venture banks experienced contrac-
tion during crisis by lowering credit lending. This
means that the global financial crisis in 2008-2009
has impacted more foreign and joint venture banks
compared with domestic banks, whereas foreign
and joint venture banks behavior is to reduce dis-
tributed credit. This study support studies con-
ducted by Pontines & Siregar (2012), Allen et al.
(2011), Silalahi et al. (2012).
The result gave description of different be-
havioral reaction between foreign and domestic
banks in global financial crisis of 2008. Looking at
graphic 1 and 2 below, foreign and joint venture
banks has contraction that caused credit distribu-
tion to decrease and then rises again after the cri-
sis. A positive significant effect towards credit
growth is shown by seeing the interaction between
crisis variables and joint venture banks, which
means joint venture bank credits behavior is to
keep increasing the credit distribution as the reac-
tion from joint venture banks towards transfer of
risk from the main banks that experiencing crisis
effect.
 
   
 
 
Figure 1. Domestic Bank Credit 
Growth 2004-2012 
Figure 2. Foreign and Joint 
Venture Banks Credit Growth 
Figure 1. Credit Growth of Foreign, Joint Venture And Domestic Banks in Indonesia Years 2004-2012.
Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan | PERBANKAN
Vol. 19, No.2, Mei 2015: 305–313
| 312 |
For the macro economy variables GGDPHome
and GGDPHome is exactly as expected. But for
the IntHome, Inthost and Size variables has dif-
ferent result with the expectation and with previ-
ous studies by Pontines & Siregar (2012), Allen et
al. (2011), Silalahi et al. (2012). The IntHome vari-
ables of foreign and joint venture is positive, mean-
ing that increasing interest rate of banks at home
country did not have any effect to bank behavior
in decreasing credit distribution in host country.
The same condition also happened at Inthost vari-
able that has significant negative effect, where the
decrease of rate interest in home country did not
have any effect on bank behavior in decreasing
the amount of credit. This condition happened
because of bank behavior to practice high interest
rate to get significant profit margin. So even though
Bank Indonesia has decrease BI rate, this decrease
was not followed by the decrease in credit rate
interest. And that is why, banks in Indonesia has
the highest Net Inters Margin in ASEAN. Bank
will increase its credit distribution to get above
average profit even though BI rate is decreasing.
For the characteristic of the company, the
profitability and solvence is exactly as expected.
But the Size variable has significant negative ef-
fect towards foreign and joint venture banks. This
result is different with studies from Pontines &
Siregar (2012) and Silalahi et al. (2012), but sup-
port studies by De Haas & Lelyveld (2010) and
De Haas & Lelyveld (2014). This is indicate for-
eign and joint venture banks have expensive capi-
tal and thus the return of capital proportion from
credit sector is minimized.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
Conclusion
This study aims to empirically examine the
impact of the global economic contraction towards
credit behavior of banks in Indonesia. Based on
the analysis of the impact of economic contraction
to the credit behavior of banks in Indonesia in
2004-2012, can be concluded as follows: there is a
different behavioral reaction between foreign and
domestic banks in the global financial crisis of 2008.
The financial crisis only has significant effect on
foreign and joint venture banks. Foreign and joint
venture banks credit behavior when crisis occur is
by reducing the distributed credit.
Suggestion
For the Government, to maintain the stabil-
ity of credit growth, the government through state-
owned banks need to push credit growth during
the crisis. As for Bank Indonesia needs to prepare
a plan for domestic banks to become “crisis-miti-
gating impact” for the Indonesian economy as a
result of the decline in credit growth of foreign
banks.
For the next studies, further views on other
credit behavior such as credit consumption behav-
ior, investment, and working capital, is needed.
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